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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC.
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,

Case No. 880502-CA
Priority No. 14(b)

Defendant and Respondent.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
a municipal corporation of the
State of Utah,
Plaintiff,
v.
JAMES CONSTRUCTORS, INC., a
Nevada Corporation, HOOD
CORPORATION, a California
corporation, and INDUSTRIAL
INDEMNITY COMPANY, a California
corporation,
Defendants.
PETITION
James Constructors, Inc., ("James"), plaintiff and
appellant, respectfully petitions the court for a rehearing on
the ground that the court overlooked dispositive issues of law
and fact raised in the trial court and in the appellant's brief
to this court.

Those issues are:

(1) Whether there was a total breach of the contract
by Salt Lake City Corporation ("the city") when it terminated the
right of James to continue performance.

(2)

If there was a total breach, whether contractual

provisions relating to delays, repairs, extras, and the like preclude recovery of damages by James.
ARGUMENT
I.
If Salt Lake City was Guilty of a Total Breach of
the Construction Contract, Contractual Limitations
on Damages Do Not Control,
In its opinion, the court assumed that the contract
provisions relating to delays, repairs and extra costs applied
even though Salt Lake City was guilty of a total breach of its
contract.
On page 2 of its opinion, the court stated as follows:
In its complaint, Contractor alleged that City had
wrongfully terminated the parties' contract and that,
as a result, Contractor had suffered the following damages: (a) $427,601.23 for delays, construction
sequence changes, and standby time costs; (b)
$92,698.97 for repairs to the project, including
repairs associated with settlement and sinkholes in the
trench, and other items; and (c) $6,542.88 for demobilization costs. The district court held that such
claims were precluded under the clear language of the
parties' contract. We agree.
In that paragraph the court is saying that even if
there is a total breach of a contract, the wronged party is nevertheless still bound by contractual provisions relating to
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methods of making claims, responsibility for repairs, and the
like.

That is not the law.
Major portions of both briefs to this court were,

devoted to the issue of whether there was a breach of contract by
Salt Lake City or by James.

James's argument was that if there

was a breach by the city and it was a total breach, as that term
is used in contract law, James would be entitled to recover
either its reliance damages or the reasonable value of the labor
and materials furnished for the project without regard to specific contract provisions relating to extras, delays, change
orders, and the like.

But, this court's opinion treated the mat-

ter as if it made no difference whether there was a total breach
by Salt Lake City.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that where there
is a total breach of contract, the nonbreaching party may recover
the reasonable value of the services performed.
Waqstaff v. Remcof Inc., 540 P.2d 931, 933 (Utah 1975),
was an action by subcontractor against a contractor for additional compensation after the subcontractor had pulled off the
job because of a long delay in making an installment payment to
him.
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In holding that the subcontractor had a right to
recover, the court said:
• * * * ^ e think the principle is correct that where
the failure to pay an installment as provided in a construction contract is such a substantial breach that it
materially impairs the contractor's ability to perform,
he has the right to consider the contract at an end, to
cease work, and to recover the value of the work
already performed.
Darrell J. Didericksen & Sons v. Magna Water and Sewer
Improvement District, 613 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah 1980), again
involved a construction project in which it was found that the
contractor had justifiably ceased work on the project because of
the failure of the owner to perform.

With respect to damages,

the court said:
On the matter of assessing damages the evidence
was deficient as to the cost of completion and therefore the court could not apply the formula of assessing
damages on the total contract price less the cost of
completion. Under such circumstances, the court was
justified in determining the damages on the basis of
the contract price, or on the reasonable value, of the
portion of the project already completed and not paid
for.
If the court or jury were to find that Salt Lake City
had the duty of selecting suitable bedding and backfill material
and determining whether compaction requirements were met, which
they could do under the facts of this case, the city's failure to
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perform those duties would be a substantial breach of the contract, and its terminating of James's right to proceed would be a
repudiation of any further duties of the city under the contract.
Such a repudiation gives James a choice of remedy.

As pointed

out in 5 Corbin on Contracts, S 1104:
As has been stated heretofore, a breach of contract may consist in a repudiation of a contractual
duty or in some failure to perform as required. In the
case of a repudiation there is no doubt that the
injured party has a choice of remedies: (1) an action
for damages measured by the amount of his injury in not
receiving what he was promised; and (2) restitution of
such values he may have already conferred upon the
repudiator. * * *
See also, Restatement, Second, Contracts, S 243(2):
Except as stated in Subsection (3) [not applicable
here], a breach by non-performance accompanied or followed by repudiation gives rise to a claim for damages
for total breach.
And Restatement, Second, Contracts, § 373:
(1) Subject to the rule stated in Subsection (2), on a
breach by non-performance that gives rise to a claim
for damages for total breach or on a repudiation, the
injured party is entitled to restitution for any benefit that he has conferred on the other party by way of
part performance or reliance.
(2) The injured party has no right to restitution if
he has performed all of his duties under the contract
and no performance by the other party remains due other
than payment of a definite sum of money for the
performance.
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The problem is dealt with also in 2 Stein, Construction
Law, 11 11.02[b]:
Where the contractor has partially completed or
performed his work at the time of the owner's breach,
he is entitled to recover damages. Several formulas
have been recognized by the courts to determine the
contractor's expectancy, and, therefore, the appropriate amount of those damages. * * *
The options set out are the contract price less the
contractor's cost to complete performance; the cost of the work
actually performed to the date of the breach (the contractor's
expenditure) plus the contractor's anticipated profit less any
progress payments made by the owner to the contractor; and that
proportion of the contract price which is represented by the work
actually performed by the contractor plus the proportion of
profit which would have been recovered had the contractor been
allowed to perform.
The author notes in a footnote to the paragraph that
"Where full performance by the contractor would have resulted in
a loss, the contractor should rescind the contract and sue in
quantum meruit for recovery."

As Professor Corbin points out,

however, it is not necessary to "rescind" the contract Ln order
to recover in quantum meruit.
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II.
The Right to Recover the Value of the Labor and
Materials Furnished Was Raised Both in the Pleadings
and in James's Brief to the Trial Court,
This court in its opinion properly noted that James in
its complaint had alleged that the city had wrongfully terminated
the parties' contract, which is another way of saying that the
city had repudiated the contract; and it raised the question as
to the types of damages to which James was entitled.
Paragraph 21 of the complaint states:
Thereafter, by letter dated April 16, 1984, a copy
of which is attached as Exhibit "E" and made a part
hereof, defendant terminated plaintiff's contract. The
termination by defendant was unjustified and wrongfully
done.
In a brief submitted to the trial court, the issue of
right to compensation in quantum meruit was raised.

At R.666 it

is stated that James was entitled to a rescission of its contract
and to compensation in quantum meruit for services performed; at
R.668, it is stated that James was entitled to payment for extra
work claims alleged in its complaint under a theory of quantum
meruit; and at R.669 it is pointed out in the argument that the
city's action constituted a repudiation or total breach of the
contract with James.
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CONCLUSION
This court in its opinion did not consider the question
of whether the city totally breached the contract, assuming without deciding that James was bound by contractual provisions with
respect to extras, delays, change orders, and the like, whether
or not there was a total breach.

The cases show, however, that

contractual conditions with respect to extra work, changes, and
the like become irrelevant where there has been a total breach of
the contract by an owner.

The contractor, as a result of such a

total breach, is entitled to recover the reasonable value of his
labor and materials on a quantum meruit basis, or the losses
incurred in reliance on the contract.

Because this matter was

not dealt with by the court in its opinion, it must have been
overlooked, and a rehearing should be granted.

If believed nec-

essary by the court, the matter can be rebriefed and reargued.
DATED this £?- day of February 1990.

/^<c^p^<
tfryce'E. Roe
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant
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